Typography

1942 Japanese Invasion Philippines Peso with a JAPWANCAP Stamp In his reply to Mike Sproul, Kurt Schuler brings up the question of the determination of the value of a very peculiar kind of money: military currency. Curious, I investigated one example of such money, Japanese-issued "invasion money" in Philippines both during and after World War II. As best I can tell, the mechanism by which the value of these military notes has been mediated has gone through three different phases, each of them teaching us something interesting about money. In January 3, 1942, a few weeks after successfully invading Philippines, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief announced that occupying forces would henceforth use military-issued currency as legal tender. Notes were to circulate at par with existing Philippines "Commonwealth" Pesos. Since this military scrip was not directly convertible into existing pesos, the trick to get it to circulate at par can probably be found in the tersely t

Kurt Schuler was kind enough to host a Mike Sproul blog post, which I suggest everyone read. I think Mike's backing theory makes a lot of sense. Financial analysis is about kicking the tires of a issuer's assets in order to arrive at a suitable price for the issuer. If we can price stocks and bonds by analyzing the underlying cash flows thrown off by the issuer's assets, then surely we can do the same with bank notes and bills. After all, notes and bills, like stocks and bonds, are basically claims on a share of firm profits. They are all liabilities. Understand the assets and you've understood the liability (subject to the fine print, of course), how much that liability should be worth in the market, and how its price should change. Mike presents his backing theory in opposition to the quantity theory of money . But I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. Rather, they work together to explain how prices are determined. By quantity theory, I mean that all t

The Blackberry debacle reminds me of another crisis that has passed by the wayside—remember the eurozone's Target2 crisis? The same sorts of forces that caused the Target2 crisis, which was really an intra-Eurosystem bankrun, are also at work in the collapse of Blackberry, which can also be thought of an intra-phone run. By analogy, the same sort of actions that stopped the Target2 crisis should be capable of halting the run on Blackberry phones. Target2 is the ECB mechanism that allows unlimited amounts of euros held in, say, Greek banks to be converted at par into euros at, say, German banks, and vice versa. As the European situation worsened post credit-crisis, people began to worry about a future scenario in which Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, and/or Portugal might either leave the euro or be ejected. If exit occurred, it was expected that these new national currencies, drachmas, punts, and lira, would be worth a fraction of what the euro was then trading for. The chance that

1,682 is the number of days that the Dow Jones Industrial Average has spent rising since hitting rock bottom back in March 6, 2009. It also happens to be the number of days between the Dow's July 8, 1932 bottom and its March 10, 1937 top. From that very day the Dow would begin to decline, at first slowly, and then dramatically from August to November when it white-knuckled almost 50%, marking one of the fastest bear market declines in history. Comparisons of our era to 1937 seems apropos. Both eras exhibit near zero interest rates, excess reserves, and a tepid economic recovery characterized by chronic unemployment. Are the same sorts of conditions that caused the 1937 downturn likely to arise 1,682 days into our current bull market? The classic monetary explanation for 1937 can be found in Friedman & Schwartz's Monetary History . Beginning in August 1936, the Fed announced three successive reserve requirement increases, pushing requirements on checking accounts from 13% t

Roaming around the econ blogosphere, I often come across what seems to be a sharp divide between those who think monetary policy is all about the manipulation of interest rates and those who think it comes down to varying the quantity of base money. Either side get touchy when the other accuses its favored monetary policy tool, either rates or quantities, of being irrelevant. From my perch, I'll take the middle road between the two camps and say that both are more-or-less right. Either rates, or quantities, or both at the same time, are sufficient instruments of monetary policy. Actual central banks will typically use some combination of rates and quantities to hit their targets, although this hasn't always been the case. Just to refresh , central banks carry out monetary policy by manipulating the total return that they offer on deposit balances. This return can be broken down into a pecuniary component and a non-pecuniary component . By varying either the pecuniary return, t

Today's go-to advice for the small retail investor is to invest in passive ETFs and index funds. These low cost alternatives are better than investing in high-cost active funds that will probably not beat the market anyway. There's a lot of good sense in the passive strategy. Here's another idea. If you're a small investor who has a chunk of money that needs to be invested for the long haul, consider investing in illiquid stocks rather than liquid stocks, ETFs, or mutual funds. Pound for pound, illiquid stocks should provide you with a better return than liquid stocks (and ETFs and mutual funds, which hold mostly liquid stocks). Because you're a small fish, you won't really suffer from their relative illiquidity, as long as you're in for the long term. Here's my reasoning. Take two companies that are identical. They begin their lives with the same plant & equipment and produce the exact same product. Say the risks of the business in which they operat