Typography

David Beckworth argues that the U.S. Federal Reserve should stop running a floor system and adopt a corridor system , say like the one that the Bank of Canada currently runs. In this post I'll argue that the Bank of Canada (and other central banks) should drop their corridors in favour of a floor—not the sort of messy floor that the Fed operates mind you, but a nice clean floor. Floors and corridors are two different ways that a central banker can provide central banking services. Central banking is confusing, so to illustrate the two systems and how I get to my preference for a floor, let's start way back at the beginning. Banks have historically banded together to form associations, or clearinghouses, a convenient place for bankers to make payments among each other over the course of the business day. To facilitate these payments, clearinghouses have often issued short-term deposits to their members. A deposit provides clearinghouse services. Keeping a small buffer stock o...

I last wrote about Fedwire data two years ago. Since then, Fedwire has entered into a (nominal) recession. Is this something we need to worry about? We should be interested in this data because  Fedwire is the U.S.'s most important financial utility. Operated by the Federal Reserve, Fedwire processes payments between the nation's commercial banks using central banks money, or reserves, as the settlement medium. It accounts for a significant chunk of U.S. spending, or aggregate demand. Below you'll see a chart of quarterly Fedwire transaction values using data back to 1992. It shows the total dollar volume sent over Fedwire each quarter: You can see that the flow of spending conducted over Fedwire has been declining since the third quarter of 2014; a six quarter decline. How rare is it to see this degree of stagnation? To check, I've plotted Fedwire yearly data going back to 1987: Assuming 2016 continues to trend lower (as it has in the first five months), then we are ...

Last week I asked whether the Federal Reserve could get rid of the $100 bill. This week let's discuss whether it should get rid of the $100. I don't think so. The U.S. provides the world with a universal backup monetary system. Removing the $100 would reduce the effectiveness of this backup. Earlier this week the New York Times took up the knell for eliminating high value bank notes, echoing Larry Summers' earlier call to kill the $100 in order to reduce crime which in turn was a follow up on this piece from Peter Sands. More specifically, Summers says that "removing existing notes is a step too far. But a moratorium on printing new high denomination notes would make the world a better place." As an aside, I just want to point out that Summers' moratorium is an odd remedy since it doesn't move society any closer to his better place,  a world with less crime. A moratorium simply means that the stock of $100 bills is fixed while their price is free to f...

David Beckworth had a very interesting pair of posts outlining how QE would only have had a meaningful effect on the economy if the associated monetary base growth was permanent. One addendum I'd add on the topic is that even permanent expansions of the monetary base can have no effect on the economy. The best example of this is the "cashing up" of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) in 2006, an event that doesn't get the attention that it deserves in monetary lore. Banks typically hold deposit balances at their central bank in order clear payments with other banks. Because New Zealand's clearing and settlement system was suffering signs of stress in the mid-2000s including delayed payments, hoarding of collateral, and increased use of the RBNZ standing lending facilities, the RBNZ decided to 'flood' the system with balances to make things more fluid. This involved conducting open market purchases that bloated the monetary base (comprised of currency...

Does a lowering of a central bank's interest rates create inflation or deflation? Dubbed the ' Sign Wars ' by Nick Rowe, this has been a recurring debate in the economics blogosphere since at least as far back as 2010. The conventional view of interest rate policy is that if a central bank keeps its interest rate too low, the inflation rate will steadily spiral higher. Imagine a cylinder resting on a flat plane. Tilt the plane in one direction —a motif to explain a change in interest rates—and the cylinder, or the price level, will perpetually roll in the opposite direction, at least until the plane's tilt (i.e. the interest rate) has been shifted enough in a compensatory way to halt the cylinder's roll. Without a counter-balancing shift, we get hyperinflation in one direction, or hyperdeflation in the other. The heretical view, dubbed the Neo-Fisherian view by Noah Smith (and having nothing to do with Irving Fisher), is that in response to a tilt in the plane, the...

A few weeks ago, David Beckworth egged me on to write about Somalian currency. I can't resist—it's a fascinating subject. The material I'm drawing on comes from Luther & White (2011), Luther (2012), Symes (2005), and Mubarak (2003) Orphaned banknotes When Somalia collapsed into civil war in January 1991, the doors of the Central Bank of Somalia were blown apart, its safes were blasted, and all cash and valuables were looted.* But something odd happened—Somali shilling banknotes continued to circulate among Somalians. To this day orphaned paper shillings are used in small transactions, despite the absence of any sort of central monetary authority. The strange case of circulating Somali shillings forces us to ask some fundamental questions about money. If the Federal Reserve and all other branches of the US government were to be suddenly swallowed up into the sea, would Fed banknotes, like Somali shillings, continue to be used? What forces conspire to keep coloured ...

I've never understood the global shortage of safe asset meme. I'm willing to be educated. I know that Ricardo Caballero and Gary Gorton have written about the safe asset shortage problem. In the blogosphere it pops up in David Beckworth and David Andolfatto , and the folks at FT Alphaville can't talk about much else. First, there seems to me to be definitional issues. What is a safe asset? Beckworth, for instance, describes them as "those assets that are highly liquid and expected to maintain their value." But liquidity and riskiness are separate concepts. There are many financial instruments that are very liquid yet risky—take the S&P mini futures contract, the most liquid futures contract in the world. There are many low-risk instruments that are illiquid—a 5 year non-cashable Canadian GIC being a good example. How are we to reconcile these oppositions into one definition? Second, it seems to me that the concept of a safety is misspecified. How do we go...

David Beckworth has a good post pushing back against people who are pounding the Fed-is-monetizing-the-debt drums. His point was that there is no evidence of monetization. The Fed today holds roughly the same amount of government debt as a proportion of outstanding debt as it did in times past. Accusations of monetization need to start out with proper definition of the term. To "monetize" means to turn into money. All banks engage in monetization, whether they be central banks or private banks. Banks monetize houses, debt, commodities and all sorts of other assets, issuing liquid liabilities in return. A credit card essentially monetizes your 30-day IOU. So to accuse a bank of "monetizing" is like accusing someone of breathing. In conducting QE3 purchases, the Fed is currently monetizing government debt and agency-issued MBS. Is that bad? The Fed has to monetize something . Would people be happier if it was monetizing corporate bonds? Gold? Or do they simply want i...

Bob Murphy asks if central bank actions taken during the early 1930s might be considered "unprecedented". In the comments I pointed out that during that era an early form of QE was tried. I'm not referring here to the famous 1933 Roosevelt purchases of gold that market monetarists often point to. For instance, see David Glasner here , David Beckworth here , and Scott Sumner here . Scott also has a very interesting paper on the 1933 gold purchasing program ( pdf ). No, I was referring to the 1932 treasury purchasing program. I'm going to replicate the simple graphical analysis that market monetarists use in order to look at the 1932 episode. See this post by Lars Christensen, for example, who overlays important monetary events (QE1, QE2, LTRO) over the S&P500. Here is the context. Prior to 1932, the Federal Reserve system was significantly limited in its ability to embark on large purchases of government securities. This was because of strict backing laws in the ...

Have commented on a few blogs that bring up the meme of collateral shortages. Commodity money: It's back! (and it sucks) at Macromania Is the Fed our savior in financial regulation? at Marginal Revolution Why the Global Shortage of Safe Assets Matters at Macro and Other Market Musings The idea of a scarcity of shortage of safe assets is nonsensical to me. I just don't think this can be a real issue. If the quantity of "safe assets" somehow collapses, then the prices of remaining "safe assets" will rise to meet the market's demand for safe collateral and stores of value. You can't have shortages in financial markets. Do you think you can? and The idea that there can be a shortage of good collateralizable financial assets sounds fishy to me. Prices for those assets will simply rise until their price is sufficient to meet the demand for good collateral. The same with an excess demand for money - prices will simply fall to meet that demand.