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Showing posts with the label David Glasner

A 21st century gold standard

Imagine waking up in the morning and checking the hockey scores, news, the weather, and how much the central bank has adjusted the gold content of the dollar overnight. This is what a 21st century gold standard would look like. Central banks that have operated old fashioned gold standards don't modify the gold price. Rather, they maintain a gold window through which they redeem a constant amount of central bank notes and deposits with gold, say $1200 per ounce of gold, or equivalently $1 with 0.36 grains. And that price stays fixed forever. Because gold is a volatile commodity, linking a nation's unit of account to it can be hazardous. When a mine unexpectedly shuts down in some remote part of the world, the necessary price adjustments to accommodate the sudden shortage must be born by all those economies that use a gold-based unit of account in the form of deflation. Alternatively, if a new technology for mining gold is discovered, the reduction in the real price of gold is f...

From corporate bonds to a fiat CPI standard

Michigan Central Railroad 3.5% Bearer Bond with attached coupons, 1902 David Glasner is frustrated that there is no satisfactory theory of the value of fiat money, noting that "it's just a mess, a bloody mess, and I do not like it, not one little bit." According to David, the core problem is the backward induction argument . Say that a valued fiat object provides no non-monetary services so that its price depends entirely on the expectation of future resale. This is a highly precarious situation since it it inevitable that someday no one will want to exchange for that fiat object. But if it is certain that no one will accept it at some point in the future, then why accept it in the first place? The explanation for the object's value rests on an "unlimited supply of suckers", as David puts it, hardly good fodder for a long term theory of asset prices. David proposes tax acceptability as his way out of the problem, although he doesn't seem to be entirely ...

Rowe v Glasner... round 33!

It's the Roe v Wade of the blogosphere, a battle that never quite gets resolved. Nick Rowe and David Glasner have been having one of their bi-annual debates over the ability of private bankers to create excess deposits. See here , here , and here . The nub of their conflict seems to resolve revolve around the following points: if we assume that 1) bank deposits and cash are imperfect substitutes for each other, and that 2) bankers simultaneously raise the rate on deposits and increase the quantity of deposits, then 3) an excess supply of deposits and cash will emerge. Nick argues for the last point while David argues against it. At the risk of only adding noise to what is always an interesting debate, I'm going to chime in. I'm going to focus on the step-by-step process by which events play themselves out, the bricks & mortar if you will. Given the complexity of this process there will no doubt be errors in this post, hopefully readers will flag them. The thought expe...

Do banks have a widow's cruse?

Elijah and the Widow of Zarephath James Tobin wrote a paper back in 1963 called Commercial Banks as Creators of Money in which he pointed out that banks don't possess a widow's cruse . There has been a bit of a blog uproar over Tobin's paper (See Paul Krugman , Winterspeak , JKH , L. Randall Wray , Nick Rowe , Cullen Roche , Ramanan , Roger Sparks , and Steve Randy Waldman ). My two bits will hone in on the widow's cruse aspect of the debate. The phrase widow's cruse is defined as "an inexhaustible supply of something," which in turn is a reference to an obscure Bible story. Flip to I Kings 17:7–16 and there is a short passage in which the prophet Elijah asks a destitute widow to make him a loaf of bread. The Lord blesses the widow saying that the "jar of flour will not be used up and the jug of oil will not run dry until the day the Lord sends rain on the land." What Tobin was referring to in his paper is that unlike the widow and her jug of o...

Scott Sumner ignores banks, so what?

In response to a recent comment by Cullen Roche, Scott Sumner wrote that "I have no interest in banking or bookkeeping. My interest is monetary policy." Now this is a point that Sumner has made before. For instance, he wrote an old post back in January entitled Keeping Banks out of Macro , in which he claimed that bank lending "is not a causal factor—it mostly reflects the growth rate of NGDP." To Minskyites and Post Keynesians like Cullen, who put a lot of importance on the banking system and the financial instability that results from bank failures, this claim is blasphemous. But given the side of the field from which Sumner comes from, I think he makes a lot of sense. As Sumner points out in his comment, his main interest is monetary policy, and Sumnerian monetary policy boils down to exercising control over NGDP. Sumner usually explains this by reference to the medium of account role of money, and though I think his terminology is a bit buggy , I agree with hi...

Real or unreal: Sorting out the various real bills doctrines

In the comments section of my post on Adam Smith and the Ayr Bank , frequent commenter John S. brought up the real bills doctrine . The phrase real bills doctrine gets thrown around a lot on the internet. To muddy the waters, there are several versions of the doctrine. In this post I hope to dehomogenize the various versions in order to add some clarity. 1. Lloyd Mints's version We may as well start with Lloyd Mints's version, since he coined the phrase real bills doctrine back in 1945 on his way to denouncing the doctrine. Mints taught at the University of Chicago and mentored Milton Friedman. [1] Here is Mints: The real-bills doctrine runs to the effect that restriction of bank earning assets to real bills of exchange will automatically limit, in the most desirable manner, the quantity of bank liabilities; it will cause them to vary in quantity in accordance with the "needs of business"; and it will mean that the bank's assets will be of such a nature that they...

Adam Smith's very own Lehman Crisis

It's interesting to see how after a credit crisis, economists start to take money and banking a bit more seriously. Adam Smith, who experienced his very own credit crisis -- the collapse of the Douglas Heron and Co , or the Ayr Bank, on June 22, 1772 -- is no exception. His views on money and banking became much more nuanced after that event. Ayr Bank had been founded in 1769 in the Scottish town of Ayr. It expanded to Edinburgh and Dumfries, and in only a few short years it had succeeded in wrestling a significant chunk of Scottish banking business from incumbents the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland. By 1772, according to Checkland, the Ayr Bank supplied 25% of Scotland's bank notes and deposits. In early June 1772 one of Ayr's largest customers, Alexander Fordyce , skipped London for Paris to avoid debt payments. A run on the Ayr Bank began that precipitated the bank's failure by the end of the month. Upon observing the bank run, David Hume writes from...

Discussions of the medium-of-account could be more well-done

Nick Rowe , Scott Sumner , and most recently, David Glasner , all say that the US's current medium of account is the dollar. I disagree. I think that the current medium of account is CPI units. Here's why. First, there's been some sloppiness with definitions in the links above, so let's define the term. The medium of account is whatever defines the unit of account . I think this a pretty standard definition. That's Bill Woolsey's definition here . David echoes this definition in his comment here . Take an old-style central bank that holds 100% gold reserves in its vault. It chooses the word "dollar" to stand as the unit of account . The bank then goes on to define the dollar as equal to x grains of gold. Thus the medium of account is gold. Our central bank issues paper notes which are to be used as the medium of exchange . Shopkeepers post prices in terms of the unit of account , the dollar, and accept notes as payment. Some shopkeepers might eve...

Data visualization: The People's Bank of China balance sheet

David Glasner and Scott Sumner have posts on Chinese monetary policy. They both inquire about the People's Bank of China (PBoC) balance sheet. I've affixed a chart of it below. Here's a quick rundown of how the PBoC balance sheet changes. The PBoC sets the yuan-to-dollar exchange rate at some rate below what it would in a free market. Chinese exporters thereby enjoy a subsidy. The law requires that the foreign currency that exporters earn overseas be repatriated and exchanged for yuan. The PBoC prints yuan (bottom green area) or provides deposits (bottom purple area), receiving this foreign exchange in return (top green area). (scribd pdf ) By creating such large quantities of liquid currency and reserves, the PBoC will force the domestic price level  to rise. In order to prevent this inflation, the Bank must "sterilize", or mop up the liquidity it has created. It does this by issuing bonds (dark blue area at bottom) to domestic banks in exchange for currency an...

Questions for Bob Murphy and other Austrians on the inevitability of the bust

David Glasner had some recent posts ( here and here ) on Ludwig von Mises and Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT). Bob Murphy pushed back here with a good rebuttal. But David's general point still stands: what necessarily forces a central bank that has adopted the practice of lending at a rate below the natural rate to ever cease this practice? Why does there have to be an inevitable bust? I consider myself an Austrian in that one of my favorite economists is Carl Menger. I've also written a thing or two for the Mises Institute, my most recent being on Menger and Leon Walras and how the two would have differed on the phenomenon of high frequency trading. On the other hand, when it comes to macroeconomics, I remain a business cycle agnostic. I'm willing to be converted though. All you've got to do is answer a few questions of mine. Say a central bank decides to reduce the rate at which it lends below the natural rate. Businesses can come to it for cheap loans -- and...

Hot or not?

The Rowe/Glasner/Sproul debate continues over hot potato-ish-ness of money. Here is Nick Rowe: The hot potatoes simply pass from one hand to another. Unless they sell it back to the banks, to buy IOUs. But why would they want to do that? If I have opals I want to get rid of I will probably sell them at the specialised opal dealer, who will probably give me the best deal. If I have money I want to get rid of....well, everyone I deal with is a dealer in money. The bank is just one in a thousand. Why would we assume that the bank will always give me a better deal than the other 999? Mike Sproul jumps in, but David doesn't, so instead I left a comment trying to anticipate what David would say: Why would people want to return hot potatoes to the bank? David explicitly sets his illustration of reflux in a world characterized by fixed convertibility. Say the central bank promises to convert deposits into x gold ounces and vice versa. If there are too many deposits being created, people s...

Interest rates and gold

Nick Rowe recently asked what the point of repoing an object was when you could just sell it, repurchasing it later. He could see three reasons. Firstly, you might repo a particluar thing because you hold it dear and want it back. It might not be available were you to simply try buying it back. Secondly, you might repo an asset because future liquidity might be an issue. Thirdly, you might repo an asset rather than sell it because future prices are uncertain. My comment used gold markets as an analogy: Nick, I think for financial assets you are right about points 2 and 3. In gold markets, for instance, you'd rather lend or swap (ie. repo) your gold than sell it (upon the anticipation of buying it back at some future point) because you might fear that, come time to buy the gold back, the future price could be much higher, or that the gold market could be illiquid and you might not be able to buy. Incidentally, you can also sell your gold and buy a futures contract. Selling spot and...

Decoding Glasner on reflux, inside and outside money, and reflux

I had a few comments on a recent David Glasner post. Basically, I was trying to understand the way he reconciles various aspects of the monetary system, namely, inside and outside money, the arbitrage mechanism that links these two assets, and the price level. David responded to me- Inside money cannot trade at a discount relative to outside money because inside money is issued on the condition of its being convertible into outside money, so they always are exchangeable at par. If too much inside money is created (i.e., more than the public desires to hold given the relative attractiveness of holding inside money relative to alternatives including outside money) it refluxes back to the issuing banks.  David says that excess inside money (say convertible bank notes) will reflux back to an issuing bank. But the only way this can happen, as far as I can see, is if somehow that bank's inside money trades at a slight discount to outside money (gold). David in his first sentence above s...

W.H. Hutt (not Jabba)

David Glasner recently posted on the economist William Hutt and his book A Rehabilitation of Say's Law : Hutt’s insight was to interpret Say’s Law differently from the way in which most previous writers, including Keynes, had interpreted it, by focusing on “supply failures” rather than “demand failures” as the cause of total output and income falling short of the full-employment level. Every failure of supply, in other words every failure to achieve market equilibrium, means that the total effective supply in that market is less than it would have been had the market cleared. So a failure of supply (a failure to reach the maximum output of a particular product or service, given the outputs of all other products and services) implies a restriction of demand, because all the factors engaged in producing the product whose effective supply is less than its market-clearing level are generating less demand for other products than if they were producing the market-clearing level of output...