Typography

I often hear the idea that the U.S. dollar is the means by which the U.S. implements sanctions. And since the U.S. dollar pervades all corners of the globe, the U.S. government's sanctions are uniquely powerful. For instance, Reuters reports that Russian resource giant Rosneft is shifting all its contracts over to euros in order to "shield its transactions from U.S. sanctions." Another version of this idea was recently floated by David Marcus, the head of the Libra payments project: "The future in five years, if we don’t have a good answer, is basically China re-wiring” a large part of the world “with a digital renminbi running on their controlled blockchain,” Marcus said. He warned about the prospect of “having a whole part of the world completely blocked from U.S. sanctions and protected from U.S. sanctions and having a new digital reserve currency” with no alternative." The shared assumption of both the Rosneft and David Marcus quotes is that the U.S dollar ...

SWIFT headquarters in Belgium ( source ) German foreign minister Heiko Maas recently penned an article in which he said that "it’s essential that we strengthen European autonomy by establishing payment channels that are independent of the US, creating a European Monetary Fund and building up an independent Swift system." So what exactly is Maas's quibble with SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ? SWIFT is a proprietary messaging system that banks can use communicate information about cross border payments. This November, U.S. President Trump has threatened to impose sanctions on SWIFT if it doesn't remove a set of Iranian banks from the SWIFT directory. For Heiko Maas, this is a problem. Iran and Germany remain signatories to the same nuclear deal that Trump reneged on earlier this year. The deal committed Iran to cutting back its uranium enrichment program and allowing foreign inspectors access to nuclear sites, in return obligatin...

The eyes of the world are on one of history's largest cash withdrawals ever. Earlier this week, the Central Bank of Iran ordered its European banker, Hamburg-based Europaeisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG , to process a €300 million cash withdrawal. Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, is being asked to provide the notes. If the transaction is approved, these euros will be counted up, stacked, and sent via plane back to Iran. German authorities are still reviewing the details of the request. Iran claims that it needs the cash for Iranian citizens who require banknotes while travelling abroad, given their inability to use credit cards, says  Bild . Not surprisingly, U.S. authorities  are dead set against  the €300 million cash transfer and are lobbying German lawmakers to put a stop to it. They claim the funds will be used to fund terrorism. The picture below illustrates $1 billion in U.S. dollars, so you can imagine that €300 million in euro 100 notes would be about a third of t...

Network view of cross-border banking, IMF, Minoiu and Reyes (2011)  PDF I recently blogged at Bullionstar on the topic of the upcoming Iranian monetary blockade. Many years ago when I was taking a political science class at university, I remember the professor teaching us two criticisms of sanctions. The first is that they don't really work—people can always get around them. And secondly, even if they are so tight that they can't be evaded, sanctions don't change the behaviour of the party being sanctioned. The Iranian monetary blockade that ran from 2010-2015 seemed to contradict both of these claims. The sanctions were very difficult to evade. And they forced Iran to come to the bargaining table and agree to end their nuclear program in exchange for economic relief. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has complied with its promise. The Trump administration has announced that it is reneging on the nuclear deal and re-imposing sanctions in order to f...

I've written before about Iranian monetary sanctions .  We can disagree on motives and targets, but monetary sanctions are undeniably a very powerful instrument. They work because in severing Iran from the global payments network, the sanctions degrade the liquidity of Iranian wealth. I'm going to borrow this idea and see if I can apply it to central bank monetary policy. Can a central bank like the Federal Reserve conduct monetary policy by manipulating the *expected liquidity* of the liabilities it issues? Can the Fed hit its inflation targets by sanctioning its own deposits or, put differently, by freezing and/or unfreezing them? Let's say that the expected return from holding a Federal Reserve liability can be decomposed into 1. capital appreciation/depreciation (ie. inflation); 2. interest (either interest on reserves ["IOR"] or the federal funds rate), and 3."liquidity services". Traditionally, an inflation-targeting central bank manipulates the ...

Some interesting things have happened on the Iran monetary sanctions front since I last wrote on the topic. In my first post I explained how the sanctions work . In my second post, I speculated about the so-called gold-for-gas trade , one of the routes Iran had been using to get around the sanctions. To recap, here's how the trade works. Turkish companies buy Iranian natural gas with Turkish lira deposits at Halk Bank , a large government-owned bank based in Ankara. Iran then converts these deposits into gold and re-imports the metal back into Iran (primarily via Dubai) in order to use it to purchase goods elsewhere or to fortify its FX reserves. There was nothing about the gold-for-gas route that contravened the letter of US sanctions. Now there is a new rule that will plug the gold-for-gas trade. Measures included in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act signed by President Obama on January 3, namely Title XII, Subtitle D, known as The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferatio...

Grand Bazaar in Istanbul What should we make of the so-called " gold for gas " trade between Turkey and Iran? Turkey depends on Iranian natural gas to produce a large part of its electricity. In normal times, the Turkish natural gas monopoly BOTAS probably would have paid for Iranian natural gas with euros or dollars. The transaction would have been settled through euro- or US-denominated accounts that both BOTAS and the the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) held at a bank in Europe. That's my guess, at least. It's become dangerous for Iranian companies to keep accounts in Europe lest they be frozen. So the NIGC has probably opened an account at a Turkish bank like Halkbank, a large government-owned institution. BOTAS likely keeps an account there too. When natural gas gets delivered across the border, Halkbank settles the trade by crediting NIGC's account and debiting BOTAS's account. What the heck does the NIGC do with all the Turkish lira it accumulates a...

Whenever we think of US monetary policy we usually think of the Fed. There's another side to US monetary policy, and its probably just as significant. Being part of the worldwide US dollar clearing & settlement system means having access to the world's most liquid payments medium: the US dollar-denominated bank deposit. As long as a nation's banks are connected to this network, goods that are produced in that nation will be infinitely more saleable. On the other hand, being cut off from it means that the same goods will be a lot tougher to move. The Iranian monetary blockade illustrates the US Treasury's ability to use banishment from the USD network, or the threat thereof, to exert incredible influence over the world. Network view of cross-border banking, IMF, Minoiu and Reyes (2011) PDF To see how this works we've got to understand how the worldwide US dollar deposit clearing system functions. Let's start at the periphery of the network. An Iranian bank (c...