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Showing posts from February, 2016

Don't kill the $100 bill

Last week I asked whether the Federal Reserve could get rid of the $100 bill. This week let's discuss whether it should get rid of the $100. I don't think so. The U.S. provides the world with a universal backup monetary system. Removing the $100 would reduce the effectiveness of this backup. Earlier this week the New York Times took up the knell for eliminating high value bank notes, echoing Larry Summers' earlier call to kill the $100 in order to reduce crime which in turn was a follow up on this piece from Peter Sands. More specifically, Summers says that "removing existing notes is a step too far. But a moratorium on printing new high denomination notes would make the world a better place." As an aside, I just want to point out that Summers' moratorium is an odd remedy since it doesn't move society any closer to his better place,  a world with less crime. A moratorium simply means that the stock of $100 bills is fixed while their price is free to f

Central banks' shiny new tool: cash escape inhibitors

Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank Negative interests rates are the shiny new thing that everyone wants to talk about. I hate to ruin a good plot line, but they're actually kind of boring; just conventional monetary policy except in negative rate space. Same old tool, different sign. What about the tiering mechanisms that have been introduced by the Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank, and Danmarks Nationalbank? Aren't they new? The SNB, for instance, provides an exemption threshold  whereby any amount of deposits that a bank holds above a certain amount is charged -0.75% but everything within the exemption incurs no penalty. As for the Bank of Japan, it has three tiers : reserves up to a certain level (the 'basic balance') are allowed to earn 0.1%, the next tier earns 0%, and all remaining reserves above that are docked -0.1%. But as Nick Rowe writes , negative rate tiers—which can be thought of as maximum allowed reserves—are si

Can a central bank eliminate its highest value banknote?

Singapore's $10,000 bill, worth around US$7500, shares title to world's largest value banknote with Brunei's $10,000 Peter Sands has adeptly made the case for eliminating high denomination banknotes. The rough idea is that if all central banks were to eliminate their highest value banknotes, then criminals would have to fall back on smaller denominations or more volatile media of exchange like gold. Since both of these options are more cumbersome than large denomination notes, storage and handling expenses will grow. This means the costs of running a criminal enterprise increases as does the odds of being apprehended. Elimination of cash is a polarizing topic. For now I'm going to sidestep that debate because I think there's a more interesting topic to chew on: might a central bank be unsuccessful in its attempt to withdraw its own high denomination notes? Put differently, what happens if everyone just ignores a central banker's demands to retire the biggest bi

Does the Fed lack the technical means to dive into negative rate waters?

The Federal Reserve may be in a bit of a bind. With the Bank of Japan reducing rates to -0.1%, many commentators are calling on the Fed to reverse its policy of rate normalization and follow Japan into negative territory.  The problem is this. Thanks to the rules laid out in the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed may lack the technical means to dive into negative rate waters. Let me restate this in different terms. If the Federal Reserve were to reduce the rate at which it pays interest on reserves (IOR) to -0.25% or so, the overnight rate may not follow very far. Monetary policy is useless, or at least less effective than it would otherwise be. Not only would monetary policy lose some of its potency when IOR falls below 0%, but an unapproved fiscal transfer from the Fed to another set of government institutions could occur. This is because negative IOR has the potential to provide a large subsidy to a narrow range of governments sponsored-entities that are allowed to keep 0%-yielding depos

Bank of Japan warms up the potato

Will the Bank of Japan's negative rates work? Many people say no, among them Louis-Phillippe Rochon : Sadly, they won't. They [negative rates] are based on a faulty understanding of our banking system. The reason banks do not lend is not because they are constrained by liquidity, but because they are unwilling to lend in such uncertain times. Banks lend in the hope of getting reimbursed with interest. But banks are too pessimistic about the ability of the private sector to honour their debt, and so prefer not to lend. Having extra cash courtesy of the central bank imposing negative rates won't change the dark economic narrative. [ link ] I disagree. Even if the lending channel is closed, a negative rate policy still sets off a hot potato effect that gets the Bank of Japan a bit closer to hitting its inflation targets and stimulating nominal GDP than without that same policy. For the sake of argument I'll grant Rochon the point that negative rates might not encourage ba