Typography

This 2 euro coin is issued by Monaco, which is not a member of the Eurozone Grexit isn't what people take it to be. The standard narrative is that Greece is approaching a fork in the road. It must either stay in the euro or adopt a new currency. I don't think this is an entirely accurate description of the actual fork that Greeks face. Over the next few months, Greece will either: A) stay a member in good-standing of the institution called the "Eurozone" and continue to legitimately use that institution's currency, the euro, or B) leave the Eurozone while continuing to use the euro 'illegitimately.'* This means either the status quo of de jure (official) euroization or de facto (unofficial) euroization. In both cases, the euro stays. The probability of a new drachma emerging is awfully low. The widespread idea that a sick country can rapidly debut a new currency and, more importantly, have that currency be universally adopted as a unit of account is mag...

There are thousands of fears, from arachnophobia to globophobia (fear of balloons) to zoophobia (fear of animals). What might the fear of market illiquidity look like? Say that you are petrified that a day will come when markets will be too illiquid for you to convert your wealth into the things you need. There are two ways for you to buy complete peace of mind. The first strategy involves selling everything you own now and buying checking deposits, the sine qua non liquid asset. Get rid of the house, the bonds, the stocks, the car, your couch, and your books. Use some of the proceeds to rent a house and a car, borrow books, and lease furniture. In renting back the stream of consumption benefits that you've just sold, your level of consumption stays constant. Negotiate the rental arrangements so that the lessor—the owner—cannot cancel them, and so that you can walk out of them at a moment's notice. Structuring things this way ensures that rental obligations in no way inhib...

In a recent speech leading up to an end-of-month national election, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe hinted at the possibility of introducing a gold-backed Zimbabwe dollar. This is from the Mail & Guardian : Then there is the business about the Zim dollar, that one issue that makes every Zimbabwean wake up in a cold sweat, and one that every candidate should really avoid. We cannot use the US dollar forever, he [Mugabe] begins. We will have to look at ways of bringing back our currency, sometime in the future. There are uncomfortable murmurs. Mugabe appears to be thinking out loud. "Should we, should we not?" he asks himself. "What if we back our currency with all our gold? Wouldn't it be strong enough? Maybe not now, of course, but sometime in the future. Maybe we will talk to [Gideon] Gono, the Reserve Bank governor." I'm sure the memories of the hyperinflation are too fresh in the minds of Zimbabweans for them to buy into the folly of letting th...

Like Guntram Wolff over at the Bruegel blog , I hope that the much-rumoured capital controls on Cypriot deposits don't get enacted. So far the Euro authorities seem to have done everything right, albeit in a slow and circuitous manner. Insolvent banks are being closed, uninsured depositors, unsecured creditors, and shareholders are being bailed in, and solvent banks are slated to reopen. Wolff's main concern is that capital controls threaten the very meaning of a monetary union: With capital restrictions, the value of a euro in Cyprus is no longer worth the same as a euro held by any other bank in the eurozone. A euro in Nicosia cannot be used to buy goods in Frankfurt without limits. Effectively, it means that a Cypriot euro is not a euro any more. Enact capital controls and we'd see the emergence of an entirely new currency trading pair CYP€:onshore€, with Cypriot euros trading at a discount. The discount would emerge since the ability of CYP€ to buy things outside of th...

Much of the conversation about bitcoin adoption focuses on its use in goods and services transactions. Breaking bitcoin news , for instance, draws attention to the fact that the Internet Archive will be giving employees the option to be paid in bitcoin. This focus on brick & mortar transactions means that the role that bitcoin financial instruments—stocks, bonds, and derivatives—have to play in promoting bitcoin adoption often gets overshadowed. I'm currently reading Barry Eichengreen's Exorbitant Privilege which goes into the mechanics of what it takes to create a truly international currency. Eichengreen points out that prior to World War I the dollar played a negligible role relative to the pound sterling in world markets, but by the mid 1920s it was the dominant unit for invoicing payments and denominating bonds. Eichengreen's theory is that the US dollar became the world's go-to currency because of the emergence of a very specific financial instrument—the ba...

I'm currently updating my History of the Fed chart . As a side project, here's what's happened to the various Federal Reserve credit programs initiated during the crisis. Most of them have rolled off the Fed's balance sheet. Even the most toxic of them - Maiden Lane I and III - seem set to be paid off. Go to scribd to see a higher resolution pdf. Alternatively, my public gallery has a high-res GIF. This chart illustrates one role of a central bank, that of lender of last resort role. A central banking facing a crisis is supposed to lend to everyone on any sort of collateral and buy all sorts of assets. If you read through the fine print of the chart, you'll see that the Fed's new facilities accepted a broad range of assets - from commercial paper to CDOs to RMBS, and opened themselves up to a fairly wide array of counterparties. What is really happening here is that the Fed is providing liquidity insurance. Liquidity insurance is like any other form of insuran...

Inspired by Perry Mehrling and Fischer Black: I think I'd take your future ideal financial model even further (slide 9). The C5 in your model provides what you call liquidity puts. I see no reason why these liquidity puts need be provided by a central bank. In the future, financial products called liquidity options - the option to buy or sell some asset (say Apple stock) at a guaranteed point in the bid-ask spread - would be popular financial products traded on organized exchanges. Just as Apple CDS allow investors to split off Apple credit risk and distribute it across the economy, so would Apple liquidity options split away the liquidity risk of transacting in Apple stock in the secondary market and evenly distribute this risk to those willing and capable of holding it. A private liquidity options market has some advantages over a monopoly last resort system. Liquidity would be competitively priced and no longer supplied in an opaque manner. Central banks would either vacate the...

Nick Rowe had a good comment on the CCPA's recent allegation that Canada's big banks were subsidized by taxpayers. In the comments I pointed out the difficulty of determining whether a subsidy or penalty had been paid to the banks because we lack a way to properly price and therefore compare the provision of liquidity services. In effect, a government program called the Insured Mortgage Purchase Program (IMPP) announced it would buy $125 billion worth of insured NHA-MBS from the banks. It eventually bought $69 billion worth. In an alternative world, the same result is arrived at when NHA-MBS liquidity options are sold by private actors to holders of NHA-MBS. These options allow NHA-MBS holders to sell all MBS back to the option writer at any time at a liquidity-protected price (some favourable point in the bid-ask spread). In a liquidity crisis bid-ask spreads increase, so the value of these options would quickly rise. The CMHC/IMPP provided MBS holders with a liquidity option...

Nick Rowe had an interesting post here . He asks how the Bank of Montreal would be different from the Federal Reserve if the Fed decided to peg it's currency to the Canadian dollar. I think the difference would be that BMO has access to Canadian Payments Association's LVTS (Canada's monopoly payments clearinghouse) and LOLR services provided by the Bank of Canada, whereas the Fed would have neither benefit.

Michiel Bijlsma and Jasper Lukkezen have a very good article on the Bruegel blog that deals with the question: why is there no Target2 debate in the US? On a purely technical note, they bring up an interesting point that Interdistrict Settlement imbalances can arise not just from capital outflows from one district to another, but from the daily redistribution of SOMA assets bought on behalf of the other Reserve banks by the New York Fed. I hadn’t previously considered this mechanism and consider it to be a good addition to understanding the debate. More controversially, they maintain that ISA imbalances primarily arise from SOMA redistribution and that regional capital flows contribute fewer imbalances. Perhaps, but that’s an empirical question. Continuing on a purely technical note, Bijlsma and Lukkezen note that when the FRBNY purchases from a counterpart with a depository account at one of the FRBs, this particular FRB then credits the counterpart’s depository account, which incre...

Nick Rowe brings up the topic. There are plenty of interesting comments there on how this would work. In particular, how would the Icelandic banks secure liquidity if they were to move to a Canadian  dollar standard? It seems to me that local Canadian banks could act as lenders of last resort to the Icelandic banking system. Alternately, if Icelandic banks were willing to submit to Canadian regulation, then perhaps things could proceed one step further and get admittance to the Canadian Payments Association, Canada's central clearing system. As members they would get Bank of Canada lender of last resort assurance.

Interesting post on Marginal Revolution, What is the difference between LOLR to banks and LOLR to governments? Cowen: “Is this transfer of the subsidy to the sovereign a bug or a feature of the plan? Perhaps this is how the EU/ECB, viewed for a moment as a consolidated entity, will circumvent EU law to finance troubled governments. Is it possible that by changing collateral requirements they can alter the flow of funds to governments in a discretionary, ever-changing, and relatively non-politicized fashion? Does this satisfy the “too complicated for people to complain about” provision?” Reply: Good post. It is probably a feature, not a bug, and it is surely “too complicated for people to complain about,” at least for now. This isn’t a new thing, though. The ECB has been lightening up collateral requirements for a few years now, presumably in part to finance weak governments through the back door. Remember when the ECB broke its rules and began accepting BBBminus-rated collateral? Relev...

Commented at Macromania on "On Bagehot's Penalty Rate" .  I think you have captured an inconsistency in the Bagehot principle. If the guiding rule is to lend at a penalty rate, then during a liquidity crisis how can the central bank ever fulfill its duty as lender of last resort? The rate that the market requires will rise but the penalty rate will rise even more, such that the central bank effectively prices itself out of the market. After all, if you can transact with the market at x%, why transact at x+1% with the LOLR? Some liquidity provider that is.  At the same time, I'm sure we can all agree that the job of a LOLR is to provide liquidity, not set market prices.  I think the problem here is that we haven't learnt how to properly understand and measure liquidity, and therefore can't price it and provide adequate liquidity insurance policies. Central banks certainly aren't great at it. Because their tools are so blunt, as an unfortunate by-product of ...