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Showing posts with the label real bills doctrine

Scott Sumner vs. the Real Bills Doctrine

This is a guest post by Mike Sproul . Mike's last guest post is here . Scott Sumner and I have argued about the backing theory of money (aka the real bills doctrine) quite a bit over the years, starting in 2009 and continuing to the present. ( link 1 , link 2 , link 3 , link 4 , …) Scott rejects the backing theory, while I favor it. I think that printing more money is not inflationary as long as the money is adequately backed, while Scott thinks that printing more money causes inflation even if it is adequately backed. Our discussions in the comments section of his Money Illusion blog extend well over 50 pages, so I’m going to try to condense those 50+ pages into two key points that cover the main arguments that Scott and I have had over the backing theory. (That’s John Law on the right. He was an early proponent of the real bills doctrine, oversaw a 60% increase in French industry in the space of two years, and was the architect of the western world’s first major hyperinflation an...

Real or unreal: Sorting out the various real bills doctrines

In the comments section of my post on Adam Smith and the Ayr Bank , frequent commenter John S. brought up the real bills doctrine . The phrase real bills doctrine gets thrown around a lot on the internet. To muddy the waters, there are several versions of the doctrine. In this post I hope to dehomogenize the various versions in order to add some clarity. 1. Lloyd Mints's version We may as well start with Lloyd Mints's version, since he coined the phrase real bills doctrine back in 1945 on his way to denouncing the doctrine. Mints taught at the University of Chicago and mentored Milton Friedman. [1] Here is Mints: The real-bills doctrine runs to the effect that restriction of bank earning assets to real bills of exchange will automatically limit, in the most desirable manner, the quantity of bank liabilities; it will cause them to vary in quantity in accordance with the "needs of business"; and it will mean that the bank's assets will be of such a nature that they...

Adam Smith's very own Lehman Crisis

It's interesting to see how after a credit crisis, economists start to take money and banking a bit more seriously. Adam Smith, who experienced his very own credit crisis -- the collapse of the Douglas Heron and Co , or the Ayr Bank, on June 22, 1772 -- is no exception. His views on money and banking became much more nuanced after that event. Ayr Bank had been founded in 1769 in the Scottish town of Ayr. It expanded to Edinburgh and Dumfries, and in only a few short years it had succeeded in wrestling a significant chunk of Scottish banking business from incumbents the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland. By 1772, according to Checkland, the Ayr Bank supplied 25% of Scotland's bank notes and deposits. In early June 1772 one of Ayr's largest customers, Alexander Fordyce , skipped London for Paris to avoid debt payments. A run on the Ayr Bank began that precipitated the bank's failure by the end of the month. Upon observing the bank run, David Hume writes from...