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Showing posts with the label zero lower bound

Death of a Northern Irish banknote

I was disappointed to see that First Trust Bank, a commercial bank based in Northern Ireland, will stop issuing its own brand of banknotes. Under different names , First Trust has been in the business of providing paper money for almost two hundred years, starting with the Provincial Bank of Ireland back in 1825. Source: First Trust 99.9% of the world's population uses government-issued banknotes. A small sliver of us—those who live in Northern Island, Scotland, Hong Kong, and Macau—get to use privately-issued banknotes. Prior to First Trust's announcement, I count twelve private issuers scattered across the globe: Northern Ireland : Bank of Ireland, Danske Bank (formerly Northern Bank), First Trust Bank, and Ulster Bank Scotland : Bank of Scotland, Clydesdale Bank and The Royal Bank of Scotland Hong Kong : HSBC, Standard Chartered, Bank of China (Hong Kong) Macau : Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Bank of China (Macau) Now there are just eleven. To our modern sensibilities, priv...

Demonetization by serial number

This continues a series of posts ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) I've been writing that tries to improve on Indian PM Narendra Modi's clumsy demonetization, or what I prefer to call a policy of surprise note swaps. The main goal of Modi's demonetization (i.e. note swapping) is to attack holdings of so-called "black money," or unaccounted cash. The problem here is that to have a genuine long-run effect on the behavior of illicit cash users, a policy of demonetization needs to be more than a one-off game. It needs to be a repeatable one. A credible threat of a repeat swap a few months down the road ensures that stocks of licit money don't get rebuilt after the most recent swap. If that threat isn't credible, then people will simply go back to old patterns of cash usage. It's worth pointing out that the idea of behind demonetization precedes Modi by many decades. In a 1976 article entitled Calling in the Big Bills and a 1980 a follow-up How to Make the Mob Miserable , Jam...

Kocherlakota on cash

Narayana Kocherlakota, formerly the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and now a prolific economics blogger, penned a recent article on the abolition of cash. Kocherlakota makes the point that if you don't like government meddling in the proper functioning of free markets, then you shouldn't be a big fan of central bank-issued banknotes. For markets to clear, it may be occasionally necessary for nominal interest rates to fall well below zero. Cash sets a lower limit to interest rates, thus preventing this rebalancing from happening. I pretty much agree with Kocherlakota's framing of the point. In fact, it's an angle I've taken before, both here and in A Libertarian Case for Abolishing Cash . Yes, my libertarian and other free-marketer readers, you didn't misread that. There is a decent case for removing banknotes that is entirely consistent with libertarian principles. If you think usury laws are distortionary because they impose a ceiling on int...

Those new Japanese safety deposit boxes must all be empty

Remember all the hoopla about Japanese buying safety deposit boxes to hold cash in response to the Bank of Japan's decision to set negative rates? Here is the Wall Street Journal: Look no further than Japan’s hardware stores for a worrying new sign that consumers are hoarding cash--the opposite of what the Bank of Japan had hoped when it recently introduced negative interest rates. Signs are emerging of higher demand for safes—a place where the interest rate on cash is always zero, no matter what the central bank does. Well, three month's worth of data shows no evidence of unusual cash demand. As the chart below illustrates, the rate at which the Bank of Japan is printing the ¥10,000 note shows no discontinuity from its pre-negative rate rise. In fact, demand for the ¥10,000 is far below what it was in the 1990s, when interest rates were positive. I should remind readers that the Bank of Japan, like any central bank, doesn't determine the quantity of banknotes in circulati...

A 21st century gold standard

Imagine waking up in the morning and checking the hockey scores, news, the weather, and how much the central bank has adjusted the gold content of the dollar overnight. This is what a 21st century gold standard would look like. Central banks that have operated old fashioned gold standards don't modify the gold price. Rather, they maintain a gold window through which they redeem a constant amount of central bank notes and deposits with gold, say $1200 per ounce of gold, or equivalently $1 with 0.36 grains. And that price stays fixed forever. Because gold is a volatile commodity, linking a nation's unit of account to it can be hazardous. When a mine unexpectedly shuts down in some remote part of the world, the necessary price adjustments to accommodate the sudden shortage must be born by all those economies that use a gold-based unit of account in the form of deflation. Alternatively, if a new technology for mining gold is discovered, the reduction in the real price of gold is f...

Are the Swiss fleeing deposits and hoarding cash?

Have Swiss interest rates fallen so low that the public is finally bolting into cash? The Wall Street Journal and Zero Hedge  think so. They both point to big jump in 1000 franc notes outstanding as evidence that Switzerland has finally breached the effective lower bound to interest rates. Let's not get too hasty. Yes, the current run into paper francs may have something to do with Switzerland having hit its effective lower bound, the point at which paper francs provide a superior return to electronic francs. But Swiss francs also serve as a global safe haven asset. And this safe haven demand, operating entirely independent from effective lower bound demand, could be motivating people to amass 1000 franc notes in vaults. The effective lower bound problem is the idea that if a central bank drops rates low enough, a tipping point will be reached at which it becomes cheaper to hold 0% yielding banknotes and incur storage fees than to stay invested in negative yielding deposits. The...

Don't kill the $100 bill

Last week I asked whether the Federal Reserve could get rid of the $100 bill. This week let's discuss whether it should get rid of the $100. I don't think so. The U.S. provides the world with a universal backup monetary system. Removing the $100 would reduce the effectiveness of this backup. Earlier this week the New York Times took up the knell for eliminating high value bank notes, echoing Larry Summers' earlier call to kill the $100 in order to reduce crime which in turn was a follow up on this piece from Peter Sands. More specifically, Summers says that "removing existing notes is a step too far. But a moratorium on printing new high denomination notes would make the world a better place." As an aside, I just want to point out that Summers' moratorium is an odd remedy since it doesn't move society any closer to his better place,  a world with less crime. A moratorium simply means that the stock of $100 bills is fixed while their price is free to f...

Central banks' shiny new tool: cash escape inhibitors

Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank Negative interests rates are the shiny new thing that everyone wants to talk about. I hate to ruin a good plot line, but they're actually kind of boring; just conventional monetary policy except in negative rate space. Same old tool, different sign. What about the tiering mechanisms that have been introduced by the Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank, and Danmarks Nationalbank? Aren't they new? The SNB, for instance, provides an exemption threshold  whereby any amount of deposits that a bank holds above a certain amount is charged -0.75% but everything within the exemption incurs no penalty. As for the Bank of Japan, it has three tiers : reserves up to a certain level (the 'basic balance') are allowed to earn 0.1%, the next tier earns 0%, and all remaining reserves above that are docked -0.1%. But as Nick Rowe writes , negative rate tiers—which can be thought of as maximum allowed reserves—are si...

Does the Fed lack the technical means to dive into negative rate waters?

The Federal Reserve may be in a bit of a bind. With the Bank of Japan reducing rates to -0.1%, many commentators are calling on the Fed to reverse its policy of rate normalization and follow Japan into negative territory.  The problem is this. Thanks to the rules laid out in the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed may lack the technical means to dive into negative rate waters. Let me restate this in different terms. If the Federal Reserve were to reduce the rate at which it pays interest on reserves (IOR) to -0.25% or so, the overnight rate may not follow very far. Monetary policy is useless, or at least less effective than it would otherwise be. Not only would monetary policy lose some of its potency when IOR falls below 0%, but an unapproved fiscal transfer from the Fed to another set of government institutions could occur. This is because negative IOR has the potential to provide a large subsidy to a narrow range of governments sponsored-entities that are allowed to keep 0%-yielding depos...