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Showing posts with the label own-rates

What gold's negative lease rate teaches us about the zero-lower bound

When people talk about gold, they usually talk about the gold price. But there are a few other key gold market metrics that often go unmentioned. The chart below stacks the gold price on top of the gold forward rate (GOFO), LIBOR, and the lease rate. The gold lease rate is an interest rate. Just as you can lend your cash to a bank at the bank's deposit rate, you can lend your physical gold to a bank at the lease rate. Understanding GOFO and the lease rate is important not only for gold bugs, but for anyone who wants to get a good grasp of the phenomenon of interest rates. GOFO and the gold lease rate demonstrate that interest rates are not phenomena solely confined to paper assets. The ability for an investor to lease their gold and earn an interest return makes up part of gold's peculiar "own-rate". All commodities have own-rates. From our perspective as consumers, we rarely get to see these markets, but they do exist. I've illustrated them in the following chart...

Zero percent interest rates forever

Noah Smith asks what would happen if the Fed kept interest rates at zero forever. Specifically: Suppose that the Fed targets only one interest rate, a short-term nominal interest rate, and that its only tool is Open Market Operations (it cannot provide any "forward guidance" or communicate with the public at all). Suppose that at date T, the Fed decides to keep the interest rate at zero in perpetuity, and remains unwaveringly committed to this decision for all time > T. He asks this because Nayarana Kocherlakota, head of the Minneapolis Fed, once said , somewhat counter-intuitively, that over the long run, a low fed funds rate must lead to consistent—but low—levels of deflation. This seems odd at first blush because we've been conditioned to assume that low interest rates lead to inflation, not deflation. I'm going to try and give an answer that financial types will understand. The spoiler is... over the short term we'd have inflation, but Kocherlakota is prob...

More on own-rates

The discussion on own-rates, the natural rate, and Sraffa cropped again. Andrew Lainton blogged here , followed by Nick Rowe here , Daniel Kuehn here , and David Glasner here . It seems to me that Nick and David are more or less on the same side of the aisle. I commented on Nick's post here , and Nick provided a helpful response. I commented on Glasner here , and he gave me some good feedback.

The natural rate of interest and the own-rate argument

The Austrian vs Keynesian end of the blogosphere often battle over the existence of a natural rate of interest. The Keynesian side typically points to Piero Sraffa's argument that there are many natural rates of interest, or own-rates, and therefore an Austrian sort of monolithic natural rate of interest simply doesn't exist. Over the last few weeks I've participated in the comments here at Jonathan Finegold Catalan's blog and here at Daniel Kuehn's blog. Here is an older comment in this vein on "Lord Keynes" blog. Bob Murphy also has a paper ( pdf ) on this subject and has commented on the above blogs on this subject. Sraffa's point that there are different own-rates was not a new one. Irving Fisher pointed this out many years before, in Appreciation and Interest (1896): If we seek to eliminate the money element by expressing the rate of interest in terms of real " capital," we are immediately confronted with the fact that no two forms o...

Normal backwardation in crude oil markets

James Hamilton at Econbrowser had an interesting series of posts ( here and here ) on determining the effect of naive commodity index funds in crude oil and other commodity markets. His hypothesis was that: the more futures contracts the funds want to hold, the more risk the counterparties who short the contract are exposed to. According to the model, the futures price must be bid high enough to compensate the short side for absorbing the risk. This compensation comes in the form of an expected profit to the short side of the futures contract.  I pointed out in the comments that this sounded very familiar to me: ...isn't this an attempt to prove a version of Keynes's theory of normal backwardation? Here is Keynes: "If supply and demand are balanced, the spot price must exceed the forward price by the amount which the producer is ready to sacrifice in order to hedge himself, ie. to avoid the risk of price fluctuations during his productions period." Keynes wrote that ...

Sraffa, Hayek, natural interest rate, and own-rates of return

I commented on the blog Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective in a post called Hayek’s Natural Rate on Capital Goods, Sraffa and ABCT . Specifically, the issues in the above blog post are continued in one of my favorite David Glasner posts,   Sraffa v. Hayek . I requote Glasner: "the rate of return from holding all assets net of their storage costs and their current service flows must be equal in equilibrium. If not, you’re not in equilibrium. So all you have to do is find an asset with no storage cost and no current service flow and calculate its expected rate of appreciation and you have the real natural rate of interest."

Liquidity options, liquidity premium, natural interest rate, TIPS, and inflation swaps

Commented on David Glasner's Once Again The Stock Market Shows its Love for Inflation : The only problem here is the one that we talked about in a previous post (Unpleasant Fisherian Arithmetic) concerning the liquidity premium that assets carry. The reason for the rising TIPS spread could be (though not necessarily must be) that the liquidity premium on treasuries is shrinking relative to that of TIPS, and therefore TIPS are rising in price relative to Treasuries. This makes it hard to pass judgment on the hypothetical rate of return on capital.  Anyways, you have already commented on this problem in your paper: “One possible cause of distortion in the yield on TIPS bonds and in the TIPS spread during the autumn 2008 financial crisis is that the yield on conventional Treasuries was depressed because of a liquidity premium. Even though the ex ante real interest rate was likely negative, because TIPS bonds were perceived as much less liquid than conventional Treasuries, TIPS bonds c...