Typography

The NYSE's clearinghouse in 1898, six years after its founding Traditional financial systems often get mocked for being slow. In North America, for instance, securities markets have recently switched from T+3 to T+2 settlement. Before, if you sold a stock the cash would only appear in your account three days after the trade—now settlement has been moved to a blazing fast two days. In an age where mail is transmitted in milliseconds, this delay seems terribly old fashioned. Or take automatic clearing house (ACH) payments in the U.S. Earlier this month the ability to make same-day ACH debit payments was rolled out , an improvement over the three or four days they used to take, but still no where near immediate. The snail-like pace of securities and ACH settlement is often contrasted to real-time settlement, say like how payments using banknotes, coins, or bitcoins are finalized the moment the token leaves ones wallet and enters the destination wallet. Or take real-time gross settlem

Narendra Modi's demonetization scheme, which involved the sudden cancellation of all ₹1000 and ₹500 rupee notes, was designed to hurt those in the underground economy who had stashed away large amounts of cash. But many smaller cash users got caught up in the blast radius. Has Indian behaviour surrounding cash changed? More specifically, what long-term impact has the painful demonetization process had, if any, on the population's preferences for holding cash? Luckily for us, we have a great data set for evaluating this question: the supply of currency in circulation. If the propensity of Indians to hoard notes has changed, we'd expect to see a long-term reduction in currency outstanding relative to trend. Before we take a look at the data, I want to make one point on the economics of paper money. The old phrase "cranking up the printing presses" is a bad one because it implies that central bankers play an active role in deciding the quantity of paper money in the

If the world had a single cauldron for mixing various monetary phenomena, it would be Zimbabwe. Over the last two decades, it has experienced pretty much everything that can happen to money, from hyperinflation to deflation, demonetization to remonetization, dollarization and de-dollarization, bank runs, bank walks, and more. Adding to this mix, the Zimbabwe Industrial Index—an indicator of local stock prices—has recently gone parabolic, having more than tripled over the last twelve months. That's a good sign, right? Beware, these gains aren't real. As is often the case in Zimbabwe, the rise in stock prices is a purely monetary phenomenon. Ever since the great Zimbabwean hyperinflation led to the domestic currency becoming worthless in 2008, U.S. dollars have served as the nation's currency and unit of account. However, Zimbabwe's central bank, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), has spent much of the last two or so years surreptitiously bringing a new parallel monetary

Data on the world's biggest monetary event of the 21st century—Narendra Modi's demonetization—continues to trickle in. The Reserve Bank of India's just published its annual report ( pdf ) and I'll just say this straight out—I'm genuinely surprised. Out of the ₹15.44 trillion in paper currency that was demonetized by Modi last November, ₹15.28 trillion, or 98.96%, have been returned. My guess would have been that a much smaller proportion of India's monetary stock made it back to the RBI, maybe 92-95%. For those not familiar with rupee prices, I'll translate the above numbers into US dollar terms. Back on November 9, 2016, $240 billion worth of rupee notes were declared to be invalid. By June 2017, only a small 1.04% sliver of this—$2.5 billion—was still unredeemed, far less than the $15-30 billion many of us though would have been left stranded. (I'll use dollars from here on since it is easier for the international community to understand.) A glance at