Skip to main content

The difference between Sumner and Krugman on liquidity traps


Daniel Kuehn and Robert Murphy wonder why Scott Sumner takes Paul Krugman to task on liquidity traps when they each seem to be saying the same thing - monetary expansion will get you out of a trap.

The phrase "monetary expansion" can mean many things. I think Krugman and Sumner have categorically different opinions concerning one specific sense of the phrase  quantitative easing's ability to have independent effects in a liquidity trap, .

When it comes to thinking about monetary policy, Krugman, Delong, Eggertson, Woodford, and other New Keynesians begin with a frictionless model populated by rational agents. No individual has the power to set prices and everyone can attain any quantity of assets at a given price. There is no limit on borrowing. With these assumptions and interest rates at zero, quantitative easing is powerless. That's because all asset prices are uniquely determined by the present value of their future cash flows. A central bank that threatens to buy bonds/stocks/gold so as to push their prices above their fundamental value will be unable to do so. All central bank purchases will be met with a wave of hedge funds sales (and short sales), thereby ensuring that the prices of these assets stay at their fundamental value. QE can't get any traction, so it's irrelevant.

On the other hand, Sumner, Nick Rowe, Miles Kimball, and others attribute an independent effect to quantitative easing. This is because they either explicitly or implicitly do not accept the assumptions of the frictionless model used by Krugman et al.

The market monetarist's departure from the assumptions of a frictionless model begins with the colourful idea of Chuck Norris walking into a room and telling everyone to get out. If they don't, he'll beat them up. Because his threat is credible, people file out of the room without Chuck Norris having to lay a finger on them. Now take a central bank that threatens to move up prices through large scale asset purchases. Hedge funds refusing to accept the threat will be pummeled by the central bank. Rather than resist, hedge funds cry uncle. Asset prices rise above their fundamental value because Chuck Norris says so. That's how QE gets traction.

So the difference between New Keynesians and market monetarists seems to rest on a few assumptions. In a frictionless model, hedge funds will undo the effects of central bank purchases. In a market monetarist model, hedge funds can't beat Chuck Norris and QE has bite. It'll be a long time before Krugman and Sumner agree on the specifics.

Sources:
Nick Rowe, Miles Kimball (here, here and here) , Michael Woodford (pdf), Paul Krugman (and here). See my old posts Don't fight the Fed and QE Zero.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Stock as a medium of exchange

American Depository Receipt (ADR) for Sony Corp You've heard the story before. It goes something like this. There's one unique good in this world that serves as a universal vehicle by which we conduct every one of our economic transactions. We call this good "money". Quarrels often start over what items get lumped together as money, but paper currency and deposits usually make the grade. If we want to convert the things that we've produced into desirable consumption goods (or long-term savings vehicles like stocks), we need to pass through this intervening "money" medium to get there. This of course is fiction—there never has been an item that served as a universal medium of exchange. Rather, all valuable things serve to some degree or other as a medium of exchange; or, put differently, everything is money. What follows are several examples illustrating this idea. Rather than using currency/deposits as the intervening medium to get to their desired final...

Yap stones and the myth of fiat money

At first glance, the large circular discs that circulated on the island of Yap in the South Pacific certainly seem quite odd. Too big to be easily transported, the stones are often seen in photos resting against their owner's houses. So much for velocity. Yap stones have been considered significant enough that they have become a recurring motif in monetary economics. Macroeconomics textbooks, including Baumol & Blinder , Miles & Scott ( pdf ), Stonecash/Gans/King/Mankiw , Williamson , and Taylor all have stories about Yap stone money. Why this fascination? Part of it is probably due to the profession's obsession with the categorical divide between "money" and "non-money". In dividing the universe of goods into these two bins, only a few select goods end up in the money bin. That an object so odd and unwieldy as a three meter wide stone could join slim US dollar bills and easily portable silver coins in the category of money is pleasantly counterintu...

Chain splits under a Bitcoin monetary standard

The recent bitcoin chain split got me thinking again about bitcoin-as-money, specifically as a unit of account . If bitcoin were to serve as a major pricing unit for commerce on the internet, we'd have to get used to some very strange macroeconomic effects every time a chain split occurred. In this post I investigate what this would look like. While true believers claim that bitcoin's destiny is to replace the U.S. dollar, bitcoin has a long way to go. For one, it hasn't yet become a generally-accepted medium of exchange. People who own it are too afraid to spend it lest they miss out on the next boom in its price, and would-be recipients are too shy to accept it given its incredible volatility. So usage of bitcoin has been confined to a very narrow range of transactions. But let's say that down the road bitcoin does become a generally-accepted medium of exchange. The next stage to becoming a full fledged currency like the U.S. dollar involves becoming a unit of account...